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1. The Federalist Papers, ed., Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), No. 39, p. 240.

2. Federalist No. 1, p. 33.

3. Federalist No. 10, p. 79.

4. Federalist No. 37, p. 231.

5. Federalist No. 2, p. 38.

6. The meaning and adequacy of the constitutional design, and the major question whether the evolution and devolution of American society result from the fulfilment or the rejection of that design are vital issues in the study of American government.

7. For example, there is no standard term in Romanian for checks and balances.

8. See James W. Ceaser, "Constitutionalism and a Semiparty System in the United States," in Robert A. Licht and Bertus de Villiers, eds., South Africa's Crisis of Constitutional Democracy (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1994), and Joseph Bessette, "Deliberative Democracy," in Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra, eds., How Democratic is the Constitution? (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1980).

9. See, for example, Philippe C. Schmitter, "Democratic Dangers and Dilemmas," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 1994), p. 62, and Roberto Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Europe (New York and London: The Free Press, 1962).

10. G.M. Tamas, "Socialism, Capitalism, and Modernity," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July 1992), pp. 69-73; Andrei Marga, "Cultural and Political Trends in Romania before and after 1989," East European Politics and Society, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter 1993).

11. Federalist No. 63, p. 385.

12. Federalist No. 63, p. 387-388.

13. Churchill, Speech in the House of Commons, Nov. 1947.

14. "Conul Leonida fata cu reactiunea," in Opere Alese (Bucharest: Cartea Româneasca , 1972), p. 137.

15. Federalist No. 57, p. 350.

16. Of great value are Peter W. Schramm and Bradford P. Wilson, eds., American Political Parties and Constitutional Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), and Ceaser, "Constitutionalism and a Semiparty System in the United States."

17. The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Anne Cohler, Basia Miller, Harold Stone (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), Bk. XI, Chap. 6, p. 157.

18. The Second Treatise of Government, in Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (New York: New American Library, 1960), II, § 143, p. 410.

19. Ibid.

20. Federalist No. 9, p. 72.

21. Ibid., p. 73.

22. See, for example, Simon Schama, Citizens (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), Chap. 16.

23. Terence Marshall, "Separation of Powers, Human Rights, and Constitutional Government: A Franco-American Dialogue at the Time of the Revolution," in Bradford P. Wilson and Peter W. Schramm, ed., Separation of Powers and Good Government (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), p. 19.

24. Federalist No. 10, p. 77.

25. Ibid., p. 78.

26. Federalist No. 9, pp. 71-72.

27. V. P. Gagnon, "Serbia's Rode to War," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 1994), pp. 117-18 and 121; also G. M. Tamas, "Socialism, Capitalism, and Modernity," p. 70.

28. Federalist No. 10, p. 78.

29. See the indispensable commentary of David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 71, 77.

30. Federalist No. 10, p. 78.

31. Aristotle: "virtue must be a care for every city . . . otherwise . . . law becomes a compact . . . but not the sort of thing to make the citizens good and just" (Politics III, 1280b7-12). Aquinas: "the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue" (Summa Theologiae, Q.92, A.1, reply).

32. Locke: "freedom . . . is the fence to [my preservation, and] the foundation of all the rest. . . . the end of law is . . . to preserve and enlarge freedom." (Second Treatise, §§ 17 and 57). Subtle but important differences between Locke and Madison concerning "faculties" and "property" are brought out by Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist, p. 74.

33. Federalist No. 10, p. 79.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist, pp. 77 and 107.

39. Cvijeto Job, "Requiem for a Nation," The Washington Post, March 15, 1992, p. C1.

40. Slavenka Drakulic, Partisan Review, Vol. LIX, No. 4 (Fall 1992), pp. 738-39.

41. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist, p. 107.

42. Federalist No. 10, p. 79.

43. Politics IV.11, 1295b1-1296a5; trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 133-135.

44. Second Treatise, § 42, p. 340.

45. Federalist No. 10, p. 79. See also Michael Allen Gillespie, "Political Parties and the American Founding," in Schramm and Wilson, American Political Parties and Constitutional Politics, p. 20.

46. Federalist No. 10, p. 79.

47. "In short, unequal faculties give men different opinions and property; self-love heatedly attaches them to the former and cooly interests them in the latter." Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist, p. 76.

48. Keith Richburg, "The Homecoming," The Washington Post Magazine, June 27, 1993, p. 20.

49. Federalist No. 10, p. 79.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., p. 80.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p. 81.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid. See also Madison's remark on Athens in Federalist No. 63, p. 384.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., p. 82.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., p. 83.

64. Cf. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist, p. 108.

65. Ibid., p. 77.

66. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.: "The Question of Conservatism," The Harvard Review of Philosophy, Spring 1993, p. 33.

67. Tocqueville, Letter to his father, 1831, in George W. Pierson, Tocqueville and Beaumont in America (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1938), p. 582.

68. Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner, The Guilded Age: A Tale of Today (1873); quoted in Paul F. Boller, Jr., American Thought in Transition: The Impact of Evolutionary Naturalism, 1865-1900 (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. xi.

69. Federalist No. 39, p. 240.

70. Spirit of the Laws XI.6, p. 157.

71. Federalist No. 37, p. 228.

72. Federalist No. 47, p. 301.

73. See the excellent account by William Kristol, "The Problem of the Separation of Powers: Federalist 47-51," in Charles R. Kesler, ed., Saving the Revolution (New York: The Free Press, 1987).

74. Federalist No. 47, p. 301.

75. Ibid.

76. Plato, Republic, 562a-576b; Aristotle, Politics, 1313a33-1314a29.

77. Article 16; Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., The Human Rights Reader (New York: New American Library, 1989), p. 120.

78. Marshall, "Separation of Powers, Human Rights, and Constitutional Government," p. 20; see also Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1981), pp. 53-63.

79. Politics III.7-9.

80. Federalist No. 39, p. 241.

81. Federalist No. 46, p. 294.

82. Federalist No. 39, p. 241.

83. Federalist No. 47, pp. 301-302.

84. Ibid., p. 304.

85. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, p. 61.

86. Federalist No. 47, pp. 302-303.

87. Ibid., p. 308.

88. Federalist No. 48, p. 308.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid., p. 309.

91. Ibid., p. 309.

92. Ibid.

93. For a recent example, see Gagnon, "Serbia's Road to War," pp. 128-129.

94. Federalist No. 52, p. 327.

95. Ceaser, "Constitutionalism and a Semiparty System in the United States," pp. 229-235.

96. Federalist No. 48, p. 311.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid., p. 310.

99. Federalist No. 79, p. 472.

100. Federalist No. 48, pp. 311-312.

101. Kristol, "The Problem of the Separation of Powers," p. 113.

102. Quoted by Madison in Federalist No. 49, p. 313.

103. Federalist No. 49, p. 313.

104. Ibid., p. 314.

105. Ibid., pp. 314-316.

106. Ibid., p. 314.

107. Federalist No. 37, p. 226.

108. Federalist No. 54, p. 337. See also Locke, Second Treatise, §§ 22-24 and 91, pp. 324-326 and 370.

109. "Distrust is a pervasive legacy of communist rule." Richard Rose, "Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust," Journal of Democracy Vol. 5 (July 1994), p. 18. The communist regimes usually destroyed trust in any relations beyond family and intimate friends. The roots of distrust in Southeastern Europe and Russia (not to mention the Middle East), however, probably go deeper in history, arising from centuries of arbitrary personal rule, i.e. generations without rule of law in the ancient and medieval sense.

110. Federalist No. 49, pp. 314-315.

111. Ibid., p. 315.

112. Ibid., p. 317.

113. Ibid.

114. Federalist No. 50, p. 318.

115. Ibid., p. 319.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid.

119. Federalist No. 51, p. 320.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid., p. 321.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid., p. 322.

125. Ibid., pp. 322-323.

126. Ibid., p. 321.

127. Federalist No. 78, p. 467.

128. Ibid., p. 465.

129. Federalist No. 78, pp. 466 and 469.

130. Ibid., p. 466.

131. Federalist No. 10, p. 83. For example, if the population of a country were permanently eighty percent agricultural, even separation of powers would not protect the domestic manufacturing interests from oppressive tax legislation. For in the course of one or two generations, all branches of government, even the judiciary, would be dominated by the same agricultural interest. In the plan of The Federalist, the size of the United States and laws fostering economic diversity should prevent this from happening.

132. Federalist No. 51, p. 325.

133. Ibid., p. 324. The American Supreme Court would be a dangerous power independent of society if it were united to the executive or legislative power this is precisely Hamilton's (and Montesquieu's) caution in Federalist 78, above; hence the importance of a judiciary that has "neither force nor will but merely judgment." We thus return to the specifically American question of the relation between the original constitutional design and the actual history of American constitutional interpretation.